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Abstract:
Judicial activism is a contested phenomenon, with the liberals and even the conservatives
championing it while denouncing its particular manifestations. In this article, I examine
the recent judicial practice of one of the most activist judiciaries in the world, from India,
where progressive politics is often, and sometimes always, associated with an activist and
benign court. Indeed, the Indian Supreme Court has a global reputation as a torch
bearer on human rights. In this article, I adopt a social movement perspective to
understand the actual impact of the court on the struggles of the poor for livelihood,
resources, values and identity, enacted through struggles for the recognition and
realization of economic, social and cultural rights. After an analysis of the record of the
Supreme Court of India, I conclude that the Court has increasingly shown a bias against
the poor in its activist rulings, and made judicial activism a more problematic device for
social movements in India to rely upon. To explain why this is happening, the article
introduces two ideas; first, the emergence of the judiciary as an organ of governance and
its attendant problems; and second, the internally biased nature of the rights discourse
which tends to reproduce binary arguments for either increasing State capacity or for
increasing choice of goods in the market place. The article concludes by exploring
lessons from the jurisprudence of other countries and international law, and urges the
Indian Supreme Court to reinvent a jurisprudence informed more by the social
movements of the poor.
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Social movements1 in India have depended heavily upon the Indian Supreme Court since
it began its activist phase in the late 1970s. Human rights groups and concerned citizens
have approached the Court for remedy and the Court has responded impressively. It has
sneaked in ‘due process’ into Indian jurisprudence to curb detention without trial2,
expanded the meaning of right to life under Article 21 to include livelihood3 and
environment4, defended the freedom of the media5, guarded the rights of employees6,
read some Directive Principles in Part IV such as basic education into fundamental
rights7, taken measures to advance gender justice8 including through a progressive
incorporation of international law into domestic law and innovated procedural measures
such as an expansive concept of standing, continuing mandamus and court-appointed
commissions of enquiry.9 Indeed, it will not be an exaggeration to say that most social
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movements in India since 1970s have actively used the courts – especially the Supreme
Court – as part of their struggles, whether it be the women’s movement, the labor
movement, the human rights movement or the environmental movement. Despite this
activism, it is now increasingly recognized that the impact of the Court on ground reality
has not been consistent. In the area of human rights for instance, studies show that the
Court’s seminal rulings are often not translated into reality for a range of reasons.10 In
addition, the Court’s activism, especially under the umbrella of social action litigation
(SAL), has itself come under criticism for its undemocratic nature, lack of effectiveness
and judicial grandstanding as well as its alleged violation of separation of powers. As
one distinguished observer of judicial activism puts it, “judicial activism is at once a peril
and a promise, an assurance of solidarity for the depressed classes of Indian society as
well as a site of betrayal”.11
In this essay, I join this critique and call attention to the limitations of judicial
activism, as it has been practiced more recently, for a progressive social movement
politics.12 Rather than criticizing judicial activism for its counter-majoritarian character

Problems” in B.N. Kirpal, Ashok H. Desai, Gopal Subramanium, Rajeev Dhavan and
Raju Ramchandran eds, Supreme But Not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme
Court of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000); S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism
in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
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Comparative Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 1998), chapters 5 and 6.
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Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2000) at 161.
12
This essay is not intended, by any means, to be a critique of judicial activism per se.
Rather, its goal is to explore the limits and possibilities of deploying judicial power as
part of larger social movement struggles, an area in which the Indian Supreme Court has
been a world leader for a long time. This essay is part of an on-going larger project of
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or its lack of effectiveness on the ground, I focus attention on the ideological character of
the Court’s particular approach to human rights. In particular, I suggest that the Court’s
activism increasingly manifests several biases - in favor of the state and development, in
favor of the rich and against workers, in favor of the urban middle class and against rural
farmers, and in favor of a globalitarian class and against the distributive ethos of the
Indian Constitution – that, when taken together, result in an ideological interpretation of
human rights.13 This ideological interpretation is the result, I suggest, of at least two
dynamics: the first one internal to the Court itself that grows out of the particular history
of the evolution of the Court since 1970s, as an organ of state governance thereby leading
to the emergence of what I call ‘judicial governance’; and second, a dynamic that is
external to the Court and the result of the human rights discourse itself, especially as it
has been constructed at the international level and reproduced at the domestic level. The
first dynamic neutralizes the transformative potential of the Court, while the second
dynamic shows the inherently elitist and anti-poor nature of international human rights.
These dynamics produce a constrained court-centered approach to human rights, despite

mine that seeks to compare the place of judicial activism in social movement struggles in
Southern democracies.
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By saying that the Court’s interpretation of human rights is ‘ideological’, I do not mean
the more common understanding that it is either dogma, or simply not neutral.
Interpretations of human rights can hardly be neutral. Nor do I use the word ‘ideology’
in a Marxist sense to mean false consciousness. Rather, what I mean by an ideological
interpretation of human rights is that the meaning of human rights that emerges from the
Court’s jurisprudence is systematically sustaining and reproducing forms of domination
in Indian society. For my understanding of the role of ideology and domination through
judicial practice, I rely on Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (1998),
especially 290-294. I also rely on John Thompson’s definition of ideology, lucidly
explained in Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law,
Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) at
pp.8-15. In this sense, an ideological interpretation of human rights means simply an
interpretation that defends and favors the status quo and the relations of domination that
constitute the status quo.
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the occasionally inspiring judgments that emanate from the Court. I argue that this
constrained approach by the Court to human rights is primarily due to its concern that its
decisions are compatible with an overall ‘logic of the state’ in which the higher judiciary
plays its appointed role as an instrument of governance much more often than its
traditional role as an institution of justice. This notion of ‘judicial governance’ imposes
inherent limitations on the extent to which the Court can be expected to be an active part
of social movement struggles for realization of human rights, particularly those rights that
are sought to be exercised in conflict with statist and developmentalist ideologies.
Part I provides a brief overview of the Indian Supreme Court’s mixed record in
protecting human rights including through the incorporation of international legal norms.
In Part II, I explain that this mixed record in protecting human rights is the complex
product of several factors including the evolution of the Indian Supreme Court as an
organ of governance, its historical tensions with the legislature, its expansion of the
human rights agenda due to its prominence as a site of movement politics and the
political and class alignment of individual judges. Part III discusses the ideological
biases that are inherent in the discourse of human rights itself, including the biases
against economic, social and cultural rights, which operate to render the Court as
marginal to social movement struggles even when it tries to incorporate international
norms into domestic law. In particular, I focus on the way the realization of economic
and social rights under international law is seen to be dependent upon either state
capacity or greater free market-led consumption and argue that this conceptualization is
part of the reason why the Court has been biased. In Part IV, I discuss some recent
dissident strands of comparative and international jurisprudence on human rights, which
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have had a much more active relationship with social movement politics, and ask whether
the Indian Supreme Court can learn any lessons from this experience. In Part V, I
conclude by arguing that the Court must abandon its ideological approach to human
rights and refashion its jurisprudence in ways that strengthen social movement struggles
of the poor.

I. The Supreme Court and human rights: A mixed record14

The human rights record of the Indian Supreme Court is, by and large, product of the
post-Emergency period in Indian politics. Partly due to its desire to atone for its mistake
in deciding the infamous Habeas Corpus Case15, and to thereby recover the moral ground
that it had lost among the public, the Supreme Court began an activist phase, liberally
interpreting constitutional rights to expand the domain of freedom. Its focus on human
rights was also politically acceptable given that the Janata government in power between
1977 and 1979 could only favorably look upon a Court which was trying to address some
of the worst legacies of the Emergency such as the abuses in prisons. Thus, in a series of
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This section is not by any means, intended to be a comprehensive historical survey of
the Supreme Court’s vast jurisprudence over more than half a century. Far more
qualified jurists and practitioners have already done a superb job of surveying and
assessing the Court’s record. See e.g., S.P.Sathe, supra n.8. Nor is it a verdict on the
Court’s undoubted value as a resource for realizing rights, like some other recent studies.
See Epp, supra n.9. Rather, the purpose of this section is only to outline the broad
directions that the Court has taken recently given its historical evolution, and to assess
evidence of judicial bias. The goal of this exercise is the expectation that the Court’s
activism can be nudged towards a more subaltern direction.
15
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521.
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cases the Court expanded the legal rights of detainees and under-trials16, addressed
custodial deaths17 and extra-judicial killings, awarded compensation for violation of
fundamental rights18 and expanded the substantive meaning of equality through
affirmative action19. The Court has also expanded the rights of women including rape
victims20, as well as the rights of children21. Its commitment to human rights continues to
inspire public admiration as the public reaction to the recent Best Bakery Case22 shows.
In many of these cases, the Court has liberally interpreted the constitutional provisions,
reading international law into domestic law.23 Many of these human rights rulings were
made possible through a procedural revolution that is a unique Indian contribution to the
world, through the democratization of standing to sue and through such innovative
devices as a continued mandamus, and judicial commissions of enquiry. The Court has
converted an ordinary list of fundamental rights into a veritable weapon of the weak
through creative judicial interpretation. In this, the Court was doubtlessly riding a human
rights wave, driven by a range of social movements that were sprouting all over India in
the aftermath of the Emergency, which were seeking refuge in the Court after finding that
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bureaucratic and traditional political avenues of action were proving to be more
intractable.
Despite this laudable activism in human rights, the Court’s record is characterized
by a serious measure of substantive adhocism. In particular, the Court’s record on
economic, social and cultural rights remains deeply unsatisfactory. With some notable
exception such as a recent judgment dealing with the right to education24, the record of
the Indian Supreme Court in enforcing internationally recognized economic, social and
cultural rights is patchy and is getting worse especially when compared to the heyday of
its activism when Justices such as Krishna Iyer and Chinnappa Reddy were on the bench.
In the area of labor rights, despite the impression that the Indian Courts remain
sympathetic to labor due to India’s pro-labor laws, the record of the Court shows an
inconsistent approach without affording protection to crucial rights such as the right to
strike though it has passed several important judgments relating to the abolition of forced,
bonded and child labor.25 Though many of these latter judgments remain current law,
they were all issued in early 1980s and not after the economic liberalization began in
earnest in 1991. Indeed, a judgment that reflects current judicial trend is the Court’s
decision in the T.K.Rangarajan case, declaring that the Tamil Nadu Government
Employees had no legal, moral or equitable right to strike.26 While individual judges in
the past have shown a great deal of sympathy to labor, including Justices Desai and
Krishna Iyer, the more recent crop of judges appear to display less sympathy. This
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Supra n.6.
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473; Sanjit
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change in the attitude of the judges towards labor rights cannot be divorced from the
broader socio-economic context of liberalization, privatization and World Bank and IMF
demands for reform of labor laws since 1991.
Even in the case of land rights as a distinct category of human rights, the Court’s
record is far from satisfactory.27 The record of the Court during the first two decades of
its existence could only be described as a grudging and resigned support as it struggled to
contain the political branches from carrying out the agrarian/land reform that was seen to
be necessary to realize the vision of the Constitution. Thus the Court frequently held that
such land reforms violated aspects of the constitutional right to property, especially the
requirement to pay compensation, even as it upheld the protection of land reform laws
from judicial scrutiny.28 The attitude of the Court began to change in the early 1970s as
more pro-poor judges such Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati joined and the Court began to
uphold agrarian reform especially under the new Constitutional amendments that had
been adopted to shield land reform laws from judicial scrutiny. As Justice Krishna Iyer
said in State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.29 while upholding the
constitutional validity of a land reform law from Kerela, “the concept of agrarian reform
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It must be noted that land rights are not protected as a special sub species under the
Constitution. Rather, it must be read as a structural feature of the Constitution resulting
from the commitment to agrarian reform in general under the Article 31 (4) and (6) as
enacted in 1950. Further, the status of land rights as a species of human rights under
international law is also far from clear and must also be read to be implied from the
‘vision’ of the post-colonial, Third-World and Soviet influenced international law, that
began to take shape from the late 1960s.
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For example, compare Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458
(upholding the validity of the first amendment to the Constitution that shielded land
acquisition laws from legal challenge under Part III) with State of West Bengal v. Bela
Banerjee, AIR 1954 SC 170 (ruling that the meaning of ‘compensation’ in Article 31(2)
meant just equivalent for the property acquired).
29
(1973) 2 SCC 713, at page 731 (Krishna Iyer J., concurring).
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is a complex and dynamic one promoting wider interests than conventional
reorganisation of the land system or distribution of land. It is intended to realise the social
function of the land and includes — we are merely giving, by way of illustration, a few
familiar proposals of agrarian reform — creation of economic units of rural production,
establishment of adequate credit system, implementation of modern production
techniques, construction of irrigation systems and adequate drainage, making available
fertilizers, fungicides, herbicides and other methods of intensifying and increasing
agricultural production, providing readily available means of communication and
transportation, to facilitate proper marketing of the village produce, putting up of silos,
warehouses, etc., to the extent necessary for preserving produce and handling it so as to
bring it conveniently within the reach of the consumers when they need it, training of
village youth in modern agricultural practices with a view to maximising production and
help solve social problems that are found in relation to the life of the agricultural
community. The village man, his welfare, is the target.” This nuanced understanding of
the importance of agrarian reform and land rights was, however, limited to some justices
and temporally limited between the early 1970s to the early 1980s. On the whole, the
record of the Court has been more in favor of property rights, narrowly construed, and
not land rights. The agonized and complex balance that the Court struck in Kesavananda
Bharati30 between the amendment power and the structural integrity of the Constitution
could also be seen, from one angle, as a balance between property rights and human
rights. Indeed, with the repeal of the property rights clause in the Constitution through
the 44th amendment in 1978, it could be said that the role of the Court in securing land
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See infra n.46.
10

rights (as opposed to property rights) has been almost negligible. This was so even
during the 1970s when political focus was on the issue of land, when compared to the
more activist role of the political branches at the federal and state levels. Since the mid1980s, and especially since economic liberalization began in 1991, land issues have not
been at the top of the political or judicial agenda.
In cases relating to housing rights or right to health, the Court has rarely shown
the kind of aggressive public policy interventionism that it exhibits in other areas such as
environment. Even in landmark rulings such as Olga Tellis, the Court has never ruled
that the slum dwellers actually had a right to housing but only that an eviction without a
notice and a hearing would amount to an arbitrary violation of their right to livelihood
which is part of right to life under Article 21.31 What is affirmed is thus a right to a
process and not a remedy for the structural violation itself. The removal of the right to
property as a fundamental right by the 44th amendment to the Constitution in 1978 has
also made it more difficult to advance a claim of right to housing understood
substantively as a spatial assertion by any individual, despite the presence of Articles 31A
and 300A. Though the Court has not hesitated from using even soft law sources such as
resolutions of the UN or even the International Law Commission to reinterpret Indian
constitutional provisions relating to environment, sustainable development or workplace
gender discrimination, it does not show the same kind of adventurism while dealing with
socio-economic rights such as housing. This is surely not because of lack of legal
sources. For example, in the infamous case of Narmada Bachao Andolan in 200032, the
Court put its seal of approval on the largest Court-sanctioned forced eviction in the world
31
32
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though abundant international legal materials existed to show that the raising of the
height of the Sardar Sarover dam was contrary to current legal standards.33 Though the
counsel in that case argued that the forced eviction of tribal people was a violation of
Article 21 read with ILO Convention 108 to which India is a party, the Court rejected the
argument.34 But it is remarkable that the counsel did not argue that several economic,
social and cultural rights of the tribal people were violated under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights35 (hereinafter ICESCR) to which
India is a party, showing perhaps how much salience the language of socio-economic
rights has before the Court. Nor did the counsel argue that the Narmada tribals had a
constitutional right to carry on a trade or business according to Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution or that the tribals had a property right under Articles 300A and 31A. In
effect, this has meant that constitutional rights – to trade, do business or to property – are
recognized by the Court only for the rich and not for the poor who are often outside the
formal legal system and therefore lack any formal entitlements under state law.
Subsequent case law on the Narmada dispute only reconfirms the inability or
unwillingness of the Supreme Court to ensure even a minimal adherence to the rule of
law and due process in the construction of India’s largest dam project, and indeed makes
the 2000 judgment appear benign by comparison. After dragging the case through the
Court for another five years, followed by an apparently favorable ruling in 2005 for the
33

For a critique of the judgment, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Limits of Law in Counterhegemonic Globalization: The Indian Supreme Court and the Narmada Valley Struggle”
in Boaventura de Souza Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, editors, Law and
Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (forthcoming, 2004).
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See id.
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art.
11(2), 993 UNTS 3.
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displaced people on procedural grounds36, the Court has once again struck a grievous
blow for the rights of the displaced people in the Narmada valley, by allowing the further
raising of the height of the main dam in the project even though most of the displaced
people have not been resettled according to the Court’s own previous orders.37 This
troubling failure of justice has occurred despite a finding of utter failure by the authorities
to fulfill the terms of resettlement, according to a confidential report prepared by a Group
of Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister,38 as well as an unprecedented 20-day fast
by the leaders of the affected community in New Delhi.39
This could be contrasted to other recent cases wherein the Court has recently
displayed remarkable activism in upholding the rights of urban landlords under Article
19(1)(g) and struck down the Bombay Rent Control Act.40 Only a fierce agitation by the
tenants in the aftermath of the judgment prevented the government from revising the
rents upwards. On top of this, the Court ordered the government of Maharashtra to
change the law forthwith, intruding into the legislative domain through activism that
learned observers see as a violation of separation of powers.41
In addition, the Court’s decisions are increasingly characterized by an urban and
elitist bias against the poor and the countryside. In a range of cases involving conflicts
36

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, March 15, 2005, available at
http://narmada.aidindia.org/docs/narmadaverdict.pdf
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Court’s judgment, see Ramaswamy Iyer, ‘Abandoning the displaced’, The Hindu, May
10, 2006.
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Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397.
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between protection of the environment and workers’ rights/tribal rights/housing rights,
the Court has chosen the former, without bothering much to balance the two objectives.42
When polluting industries are ordered to be closed by the Court, the workers and their
families who are directly affected, are rarely heard before orders are issued. The Court’s
remarks often display much attention to the environmental issues that are of importance
to urban dwellers such as pollution, while showing relatively less attention to rural
livelihoods, which are often intricately tied to the land and forests. In the Narmada case,
for instance, the Court showed complete callousness to the plight of the rural and tribal
people targeted for displacement and declared that “the displacement of the tribals and
other persons would not per se result in the violations of their fundamental or other rights.
The effect is to see that on their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than
what they were. At the rehabilitation sites they will have more and better amenities than
which they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream of
the society will lead to betterment and progress”.43 Implicit in this is the notion that rural
and tribal livelihoods are inferior and bound to be displaced through urbanization and
modernization. Likewise, the Court’s activism in the area of environment is also
characterized by a readiness to protect the environment and health of the rich while
ignoring the structural poverty and governmental failure that causes these health
problems in the first place. For instance, in Ratlam Municipal Council case44, the Court
was ready to rely on section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code to order a municipality
42

See e.g., M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 227; F.B. Taraporawala v.
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to abate public nuisance caused by open drains and public excretion by slum-dwellers,
reading environmental protection broadly to include health and injecting that reading into
Part III. But the Court’s order did not concern the rights of the slum dwellers themselves
whose recourse to public excretion was the result of lack of infrastructure which is the
responsibility of the municipality though Justice Krishna Iyer pointed out that “decency
and dignity are non-negotiable facets of human rights and are a first charge on local selfgoverning bodies”.45 Nor did it concern the rights of those dalits who are socially
condemned to perform the odious practice of manual cleaning of public toilets, despite
the fact that it has been outlawed.46 Indeed, in several cases, the state courts have also
ordered specific measures such as construction of extra public latrines for protecting
human health and sanitation under Article 21, while ignoring the rights of the dalits who
are employed to clean them manually.47 To point out these facts is not to belittle the
valiant record of the Court in protecting the environment or in attempting to shore up
processes of governance, but it must be recognized that the Court’s record has much
room for improvement.
To sum up, the Court’s approach to human rights enforcement could be said to
overemphasize civil and political rights at the cost of economic, social and cultural
rights.48 The result of this overemphasis is that the Court has tended to relatively neglect
those rights that are of most importance to the vulnerable segments of India society, often
45

Id. at 1629.
Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition)
Act, 1993.
47
See e.g., Dr. K.C.Malhotra v. State of M.P., AIR 1994 MP 43; L.K.Koolwal v. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1983 Raj.2; Kinkri Devi v. State, AIR 1988 HP 4.
48
For an earlier statement, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘The Supreme Court and Human
Rights’, The Hindu (December 6, 2000).
46
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organized in the form of a multitude of social movements. To put it this way may be
seen as somewhat unfair to the Court and some objections could be raised. First, it could
be contended that the Court is constrained by the language of the Indian Constitution,
which makes fundamental rights in Part III judicially enforceable and leaves the Directive
Principles of State Policy in Part IV as policy aspirations. Given that many socioeconomic rights are contained in Part IV, it could be argued that the Court could not
enforce them as robustly as it does the rights contained in Part III. That claim is not wellfounded because the Court has not hesitated from reading several other Directive
Principles into fundamental rights, such as the policy of environmental protection in
Article 48A into Article 21. The Court could, if it wishes, do the same with regard to
housing, redistribution of wealth and health. Second, it could be argued that the
Court may have been constrained by a need to respect the boundary between law and
policy, or that it could have been concerned about its own function and role vis-à-vis
other branches of government or that it wanted to ensure that its orders had a reasonable
prospect of being implemented. None of these arguments hold any water since the Court
has rarely paid much attention to these issues in its impressive career of judicial
activism.49 For example, in the area of environment, the Court has issued orders for
closing tanneries, shut down polluting industries and closely supervised enforcement of
statutes, rarely constrained by a concern to respect the boundary between law and
policy.50 Even when it was clear that the enforcement of these judicial orders had
financial implications that only the government and the legislature had the power to
49

For a discussion of these possible limits to judicial activism, see Desai and Muralidhar,
supra n.8 at 176-183.
50
For a discussion, see Harish Salve, “Justice between generations: Environment and
social justice” in Supreme But Not Infallible, supra n.8.
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sanction, the Court has treated this issue as having no juridical basis.51 This could be
contrasted to the attitude of the Court relating to housing rights when it suddenly
discovers that financial implications do matter for enforcement.52 What could explain
this inconsistency?

II. Explaining the mixed judicial record: Judicial Governance and the ideology of judging

What then can explain why the one of the most activist courts in the World is biased
in favor of some rights while ignoring the rest? What can explain the urban or class bias?
For one answer, I suggest that we look to what I call ‘judicial governance’. By this, I
mean the emergence of governance functions assumed by the Court in the face of a
failing or failed state apparatus that proves unwilling or is incapable of carrying out its
mandate under the law and the Constitution. The Supreme Court has increasingly
assumed this function since the early 1970s and in that process, come to share many of
the biases that are inherent in process of governance itself.53 Let me explain.
During the first two decades of its history, the Court was largely positivistic, strictly
interpreting the Constitution using the traditional canons of statutory interpretation. As
the legal expert Rajeev Dhavan puts it, “there was never any great dissonance between
51
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Nehru’s developmental plan for the Indian people and the positivist theory of law that the
British had bequeathed to the courts of independent India. The fact that the Constituent
Assembly had scripted a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights into the text of the
Constitution did not disturb the positivist credentials of Indian law. The fundamental
rights guaranteed to the citizen had been perceived as essentially ‘legal rights’ granted by
a super statute: each one of the rights had been hedged in by limitations and was
interpreted like any other statute”.54 This positivist approach could be seen, for instance
in A.K.Gopalan case55 while interpreting Article 21 in a legalistic and narrow manner.
This positivist approach to law began to change somewhat during the mid-1960s as can
be seen in the Golaknath case56, once it became obvious that the courts were slowing
down needed economic and social reform through their positivist methodology, leading
to great tensions between the judiciary and the government. As Justice Subba Rao, CJ,
said in Golak Nath, “…Articles 32,141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic
terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice…To
deny this power to the Supreme Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the
court only finds the law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful
instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country”.57
Enunciating the ‘basic structure’ doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati case58 was yet another
instance of judicial craft that repudiated its positivist legacy. But the true turn-around

54

See Rajeev Dhavan, “Judges and Indian Democracy: The Lesser Evil?” in Frankel
Franncine et al (ed.) Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy
(Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2000) at 322.
55
A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
56
I.C.Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
57
Id. At 1668-9.
58
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
18

came after the Emergency, when the Court turned away from formalism and positivism
entirely, as witnessed in the Manekha Gandhi case59 where the Court fully repudiated
A.K.Gopalan and launched Article 21 in a new expansive direction.
The Court was doing this against the background of a widespread failure of the state
to do socio-economic justice resulting in the emergence of a multitude of social
movements across the country, among farmers, peasants and women.60 The moral
credibility of the Congress Party, the grand old party of independence, had collapsed, and
the government had lost its legitimacy due to the repression during the Emergency. The
Janata government which followed in 1977 was weak. These circumstances, coupled
with the Court’s own attempt at mea culpa for its role during the Emergency, led to the
consecration of the judiciary – no doubt self-imagined to some extent61 – as the preferred
branch of governance. The Court’s willingness to assume powers of governance, as
witnessed in the growth of SAL, also compelled the Court to share the goals of
governance and tolerate the methods of governance, much more than in the past.
One such goal was sustainable development, a concept of development laced with
environmentalism. The Court’s activism in the environmental area from the early 1980s
was not happening in a vacuum, but as part of a state making process that was
reconfiguring the goals of the Indian state itself. Following the 1972 Stockholm UN
Conference on the Environment, the regulatory authority over forests was transferred
from the State list to the Concurrent list in the Constitution in 1976, allowing shared
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federal and state authority. The Prime Minister issued a directive in 1980 mandating
environmental impact assessments by federal agencies for medium and major irrigation
projects. The Indian Parliament passed the Forest Conservation Act in 1980 and the
federal environmental department was upgraded to the Ministry of Environment and
Forests in 1985.62 Several Indian environmental NGOs were also established in the
1970s including the Center for Science and Environment and Kalpavriksh, while
environmental movements had been witnessed in parts of the country such as the Silent
valley agitation and the Chipko movement.63 Against this background, the Court’s
environmental activism must be seen as a result of the contestation between different
social actors over the meaning and direction of the goals of the Indian state itself.
As a result of the Court’s assumption of governance functions, its approach to human
rights is determined by its congruence, at any given time, with the overarching ideologies
of statism and developmentalism which remain dominant ideologies of governance. Put
differently, the Court is generally loath to find for a petitioner who is asserting rights that
openly contradict with either the dominance of the state or with the vision of socioeconomic and cultural change that is implied in the grand vision of development. This is
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because, the Court, as a governance mechanism, shares the ideologies of statism and
developmentalism. The meanings of these ideologies do not remain fixed; rather, they
change over time, reflecting the dominant theories and social relations of the day. Thus,
developmentalism has meant many things from state-led industrial growth to sustainable
development to rights-based development to neoliberal development. Indeed, many of
these meanings coexist in tension within the ideological matrix of the state and the
judiciary is not free from them. These ideologies enable the Court to justify the sacrifice
of some human rights for others and the social costs imposed on some in the interest of
others, but to do so for different reasons at different times. Thus, in the Narmada case,
the Court derisively characterized the Narmada Bachao Andolan, the petitioner, as an
‘anti-dam organization’ and declared that the “displacement of these people would
undoubtedly disconnect them from their past, culture, custom and traditions, but then it
becomes necessary to harvest a river for the larger good”.64 This is one reason why the
Court is biased in favor of some rights over others.
A second reason why the Court may be biased in favor of some rights over others has
to do with the particular history of the Court’s long tussle with the legislature over the
question of property rights. This complex story has been well told elsewhere by
scholars65, but for our purposes, it must be noted that the Court’s conflict with the
legislature starting with the First Amendment to the Constitution and extending until the
1970s did not completely end with the Kesavananda Bharati case, but has cast its long
shadow over the relationship between Part III and Part IV and the future of socio-
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economic rights. Since most socio-economic rights are listed as policy aspirations under
Part IV, the only legitimate measures that may be taken to enforce them are by the
government unless the Court decides to read a Directive Principle into Part III, thus
enabling individuals to claim their rights, which is something the Court has done often.
But that creates a problem as the Court has had a bitter history of conflict with the
government over whether the measures taken to enforce Directive Principles must
themselves comply with Part III rights. To put it differently, the Court has come to see
itself, for historical and textual reasons, principally as the defender of Part III rights
especially when weighing governmental measures that seek to give effect to the
principles in Part IV. This has resulted in creating a structural bias in favor of civil and
political rights which dominate Part III unless the Court decides to read the principles of
Part IV into Part III. This could be evidenced, for instance, in the way in which almost
all implied rights – livelihood, environment, education – have been read into Article 21
and therefore translated as a civil or political right. Given this history, it is not surprising
that the Bar so often frames its arguments in terms of the rights in Part III.
A third reason for the bias of the Court in favor of some rights over others has to
do with social movement politics itself. Social movements in India, as elsewhere, tend to
be highly suspicious of courts and law because of their perception as elite defenders of
the status quo. In the Indian context, this perception is not without reality. As such,
social movements tend to approach courts relatively rarely unless they stand to gain
immediately either through publicity, or to stave off disasters. Given that social
movements tend to be a primary driving force behind the enforcement of most socioeconomic rights, this has the result of keeping these rights issues off the Court’s agenda.
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Instead, the Court is faced with issues that tend to dominate the mainstream NGO agenda,
such as torture, custodial deaths, environment and more recently, women’s rights.
A fourth reason for the bias of the Court can be found in the individual class and
political alignments of judges, as well as their individual training and outlook towards
socio-economic issues. The social philosophy of the individual judges often determines
the outcomes of cases in India (as elsewhere), where the Court does not sit en blanc as in
the US, but rather constitutes itself in 2 and 3 judge benches. These benches are also not
constant as judges retire very often even as the cases drag on for years. This may mean
that a single case may see several judges deciding different aspects. The individual
ideology of judges becomes extraordinarily important as a result. A case in point is
Narmada, where Justice Barucha was the only judge who stayed on the Bench from 1994
(when the case was initiated) to 2000 (when the judgment was delivered). It is not
coincidental that he was the sole dissenting judge who found in favor of the NBA. In
addition, individual judges often dramatically differ on the extent to which they are
receptive to arguments about constitutionalizing socio-economic rights including by
reliance on international law. For example, a survey of the Supreme Court judgments
shows that the majority of cases in which the Court has referred to the ICESCR have
been decided by one judge, K. Ramaswamy, and most of them have been decided since
the mid-1990s.66
A final reason for the bias of the Court in favor of some rights has to do with the role
of the Bar itself. The Indian Bar, while tremendously talented, has not aggressively
pushed for adjudication of socio-economic rights and does not seem to draw on the most
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current trends in international and comparative law. As pointed out earlier, the counsel
for Narmada Bachao Andolan made few, if any, references to the extensive international
and comparative jurisprudence on forced eviction. As a result, even in the field of
environmental law, the Court has tended mostly to rely on domestic Indian legal sources,
and not on the most current comparative and international legal materials.67 The
judgments themselves are often confusing and show a breezy familiarity with
international law68 and do not draw on the experience of some of the most progressive
constitutional courts in the world adequately, such as the South African Court. The
responsibility for this lies, ultimately, with the Bar which lacks adequate representation
from oppressed groups such as dalits.

III. The ideology of human rights discourse and the limits of the Court’s value to social
movements

A second set of explanations for the bias of the Court against socio-economic
rights are to be found within the discourse of human rights itself. This discourse, which
is international in origin, is generally taken to be a neutral one in which all rights are
67
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equal, indivisible and interdependent. Far from this, the conceptualization of socioeconomic rights within the human rights discourse is deeply problematic and constrains
any judiciary that is mandated to enforce it. It is not my claim here that civil and political
rights are more privileged in the language of the human rights treaties than economic,
social and cultural rights. That familiar claim69, while true, captures only part of the
problem. The other part of the problem relates to the way socio-economic rights are
conceptualized, and the specific problems that a court is said to encounter while
attempting to enforce such rights.70 To state my argument in a nutshell, socio-economic
rights tend to be conceptualized in the international legal lexicon in specific ways that
make their realization depend on either state capacity to provide such rights or on the
availability of market mechanisms that can ensure constantly increasing ‘standards of
living’ (as the ICESCR puts it71) through greater consumption. The choice for realizing
socio-economic rights then, is between increasing state capacity on the one hand and a
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culture-ideology of consumerism, led by market fundamentalism, on the other. In the
context of most post-colonial states, increasing state capacity is not an attractive option as
it assumes that the state will not be predatory. Markets, by themselves, have no track
record of ensuring the socio-economic rights of the poor by encouraging greater
consumption.72 Within this constrained framework, socio-economic rights lose their
emancipatory potential, and the Court, no matter how heroic, cannot overcome this
framework easily. The ideologies of socio-economic rights in the international legal
lexicon overwhelm the constitutional ideologies of equality or justice which may in fact
provide space for social movement struggles for realization of rights.
First, what are socio-economic human rights and what were states’ attitudes
towards them? Socio-economic rights including education, health, standards of living,
trade union rights, housing, water, food, cultural identity etc are contained in the
ICESCR. As is well-known, unlike the ICCPR73, which mandates that all rights should
be immediately implementable, the ICESCR subjects the guarantee of rights to two
conditions: that they should be “progressively realizable” and that the realization should
be subject to “available resources”. So-called 3rd generation rights are collective or
solidarity rights such as the rights to development, environment and peace. The
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights74 (UDHR) makes no distinctions between rights,
but due to the ideological rivalry during the Cold War, two different covenants were
adopted in 1966 – ICCPR and ICESCR. Underlying each was a deep division over the
appropriate role of the state in the economy. The debates during drafting show that while
many if not most western states were in support of 2nd generation rights in principle, there
were serious divisions over the responsibilities of states.75 Indeed, the covenants, being
treaties, were drafted as the legal responsibilities of states. As such, the concern during
the drafting of the covenants was not so much whether socio-economic rights were
important for human dignity (a major goal of the effort) but whether the states could
afford to guarantee them. In other words, the human rights debate became one about
state capacity rather than human dignity.76 In the context of the 1960s, this was then a
debate about the appropriate developmental role of the state – a proxy war between the
dirigist and market-oriented models of economy.
In this debate, so-called developing countries – at least those that were
decolonized – were mostly supportive of a strong role of the state in the economy. The
reason was that these newly independent countries were terribly interested in nation
building and saw the state as the main instrument for achieving economic and social
development, so that they could “catch up” with the west. India was no exception.
Vesting the state with the obligation to ensure housing, education or standard of living for
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its citizens, gave a moral justification for the developmental role of the state. This is
important to bear in mind, as the developmental role of the state has been substantially
delegitimated now both due to the miserable record of the developmental state in the third
world (its violence) and the triumph of neoliberal ideology that dictates the almost
complete withdrawal of the state from the economy.77 In this context, a state that is fully
committed to the entire panoply of human rights including socio-economic rights appears
to stand a better chance of ensuring development and progressive state building – as is
evidenced by South Africa – but it would require that socio-economic rights be recast
first.
So-called 3rd generation rights began emerging in the context of intense NorthSouth politics in the 1970s. The failure of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77
group of countries to push the New International Economic Order (NIEO) debate to any
real results during the 1970s meant that the Third World states needed some other
ideological basis for contesting the power and influence of the West. They turned to
human rights discourse to resignify the debate about development. Starting with the
Declaration of Tehran of 1967, this gained momentum and agencies such as UNESCO
and ILO played a key role in pushing the debate on human rights and peace and human
rights and development during the 1970s. After the articulation of the right to
development in the 1970s and after almost a decade of intense transformation in UN
practice, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development
in 1986. By that time, a right to peace had been already declared.
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Thus the ideological debate about development had shifted terrain and now had
fully arrived in the area of human rights. It is well-known that the 1986 Declaration on
Right to Development was ideologically polarized (US voted against with some western
countries abstaining) and has proved to be controversial ever since. The impact of the
new developmentalization of human rights was quite profound. First, it was during the
1970s that the UN doctrine on the ‘interdependence, indivisibility, and
interconnectedness of all human rights’ became official. This meant that officially at
least, the debates about the hierarchy of human rights, and tradeoffs between human
rights, had been settled. Second, the embrace of human rights by Third World states at
the diplomatic level, and the entry of new Third World states into the UN Commission on
Human Rights in 1979, had domestic repercussions and led to demands for more
democracy and human rights within states. This political background to socio-economic
rights is crucial for appreciating the criticisms leveled at socio-economic rights as well as
the limitations inherent in their conceptualization due to their historical trajectories.
What are some of the traditional criticisms of socio-economic rights?
Traditionally, mainstream international lawyers in the West have been rather dismissive
of socio-economic rights and Western state practice has also been often hostile to these
rights78 though there is now an attempt to engage in revisionist history wherein the US in
particular,79 was only promoting economic and social rights when it pushed for free

78

I am not flooding this paper with too many citations for much of what follows as its
broad arguments are well rehearsed in the field of human rights. For one example of
some traditional tensions in the field of socio-economic rights, see J. Oloka-Onyango,
‘Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in
Africa’, 26 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 1 (Fall 1995).
79
Thus, according to the Attorney Advisor to the Department of State, “during the Cold
War, Western governments championed democratic institutions and the operation of the
29

markets during the Cold War. Leading NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch have also begun recasting their mandates to deal more directly with
economic and social rights, though they continue to express doubts.80 I list some wellknown and oft-discussed criticisms of economic and social rights here that seem most
relevant to the context in India, including the following, while providing my assessments
of those critiques:
a. A first criticism is that socio-economic rights do not fit conceptually within the
idea of rights, which are generally taken to mean negative liberties rather than
positive entitlements. Never highly persuasive, this criticism has two major
problems. First, the idea of rights as negative liberties alone is a highly narrow
and almost ethnocentric one that reflects a particular western tradition and cannot
therefore, serve as the basis of universal rights. Second, even negative liberties
turn out to have positive entitlements – for example, the right to fair trial requires
the provision of legal representation to those who cannot afford any under the
ICCPR. So, conceptually, the idea that human rights are the rights to be left alone
does not hold much water even if we take classic civil and political liberties.81
b. A second critique is that socio-economic rights are not rights, but aspirations of
what a desirable society looks like. Proponents of this critique, who include many
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American constitutional lawyers such as Cass Sunstein82, criticized the Eastern
European states for enshrining socio-economic rights in their constitutions. The
major problem with this critique is that it equates socio-economic rights with the
welfare state, a massive statist enterprise to provide public housing, free
education, health and massive subsidies for food etc. This has a rich tradition
even in human rights scholarship, which often conflates socio-economic rights
with the welfare state, as rights to government programs83. Reducing socioeconomic rights to welfare statism or government programs simply reenacts the
same flaw that characterized the birth of the covenants in 1966 when the debate
about rights became a debate about state capacity. In addition, a strand of this
critique also equates socio-economic rights with the freedom to acquire goods, or
simply greater consumption. In areas like health or housing for example, one can
see a clear evidence of this tendency. In this guise, socio-economic rights simply
become equated with marketization and the freedom to ‘choose’ goods in the
market. This is how, for example, the World Bank has conceived its own role visà-vis socio-economic rights in recent years.84 If the former strand of this critique
aims at supply-side solutions to violations of socio-economic rights, the latter
strand offers demand-side solutions. If we stop seeing rights-holders as passive
recipients of government benefits or as inexorable consumers, but rather as active
82

Cass Sunstein, ‘Against Positive Rights’, 2/1 East.Eur.Const. Rev. 35 (1993). He has
since changed his position and is now a supporter of economic and social rights. See
Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR'S Unfinished Revolution and Why We
Need It More than Ever (Basic Books, 2004).
83
E. Vierdag, ‘The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 9 Netherlands Ybk. Int. L. 69 (1978).
84
See e.g., World Bank, Human Rights and Development: The Role of the World Bank
(1998).
31

shapers and enforcers of their own rights through vigorous democratic
participation, the hollowness of this critique is exposed. In fact, a really
meaningful socio-economic rights agenda must rest on a strong critique of
welfare statism, market fundamentalism and the culture-ideology of consumerism.
I would suggest that this is in fact the emerging meaning of socio-economic rights
as can be see from recent dissident strands of constitutional and international
jurisprudence as well as the practice of social movements that are discussed in the
next section.
c. A third critique is that socio-economic rights are not justiciable or as the ICESCR
puts it, the rights are “progressively realizable” within “available resources”.85
The argument is that this is both because it costs money to implement them, and
also because judges lack the legitimacy, competence and the power to
meaningfully address them. I deal with the latter part of the critique in the next
section. Regarding the first part, it can be easily rebutted. As Henry Shue and
others have shown, it takes a lot of money to implement most civil and political
rights such as the right to vote simply because the enjoyment of these rights
requires a sophisticated infrastructure of state agencies and civil society actors.86
Socio-economic rights are no different. Besides, it is increasingly recognized that
the enjoyment of socio-economic rights rest not so much on resources as in the
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lack of voice/power. In Amartya Sen’s language, the entitlements depend on
capabilities, which in turn are a product of disabilities imposed by race, gender,
class, ethnicity and variety of other social, political, economic and cultural
dimensions of life.87 As Sen has pointed out, the life expectancy of American
blacks is lower than the people in Kerala, even though the US is so much
wealthier than India in per capita terms.
d. A fourth criticism is that there is a hierarchy among rights and socio-economic
rights do not rank at the top. The idea of hierarchy of rights comes in different
forms in international law. It can be seen in the notion of jus cogens for example,
that confines its meaning to certain massive human rights violations such as
genocide or even prohibition of torture, but does not include other massive human
rights violations as hunger or forced eviction/destruction of housing. It can also
be seen in the idea that certain rights are core rights while others are not. Even in
specialized areas of human rights such as those relating to labor, the idea of core
standards is prevalent.88 If we look at what these are, they invariable turn out to
be civil and political rights (freedom to organize for instance) but not socioeconomic rights (such as occupational health). The idea of core rights is not only
arbitrary, ideological and biased, it is also dangerous, as it shows a green signal
for violation of other rights by states and other actors.
In addition to the problems that are inherent in the conceptualization of socioeconomic rights, it is also often suggested that there are also specific problems relating to
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their enforcement by courts. What are some of these problems? So-called 3rd generation
rights have rarely come before the courts though, as I have noted earlier, the right to
environment has been interpreted by the Court to be part of right to life under article 21
of the Constitution. Socio-economic rights have been litigated for years before domestic
courts. Learning from this experience, one can reflect on some additional criticisms of
socio-economic rights that are traditionally made from the perspective of judging.
These criticisms are three fold.89 First, it is mentioned that judges lack the
legitimacy to adjudicate socio-economic rights because they are not elected
representatives of the people. The reason why this is important is that the determination
of socio-economic rights is said to require decisions of a budgetary nature, which are
supposed to be left to other branches of government. Ordering the enforcement of a right
to housing will, in this view, unnecessarily intrude into the domain of the legislature and
the executive by shifting resources from other areas. Second, it is alleged that judges
lack the technical competence to adjudicate socio-economic rights as they require
mastery of complex social and economic policies and often massive amount of data. It is
advised that judges should leave this complex task to administrative agencies that have
the competence to do it. A third critique is that a judicial approach to the enforcement of
socio-economic rights is not the right way to their realization as it is too fragmentary,
sporadic and lacks the scale required to address massive problems such as illiteracy or
slums.
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None of these critiques hold much water. First, while adjudicating civil and
political rights, the judges make decisions that have serious budgetary implications as
well. For example, ordering an improvement in prison conditions or mandatory legal
representation costs money and may not reflect the existing law. If judges can do this,
why can’t they order improvements in socio-economic rights that have budgetary
implications? Also, the elected representatives themselves often lack legitimacy and
courts may be no more or less legitimate than undemocratic or corrupt representative
institutions. Finally, legitimacy in not simply a product of elections, but could also be
seen as a product of fidelity to core constitutional values or global ethics. A court may in
fact be upholding this conception of legitimacy when it decides that the constitution
requires the enforcement of socio-economic rights even against existing law or policy.
Second, the question of competence of judges over economic and social policies
is also a ruse. Administrative agencies and often legislators are often equally
incompetent over the details of economic and social policy and yet they take crucial
decisions that shape public policy. Besides, adjudication of commercial and related
matters such as antitrust or tax requires a great deal of technical skill that judges are
allowed and even expected to have. If they can do so in commercial matters, why can’t
they do the same in adjudicating socio-economic rights?
Third, the problem of scale, that an adjudicatory approach to socio-economic
rights is not by itself adequate, is a serious critique. An excessive reliance on the
judiciary to realize socio-economic rights is certainly bad and will not address systemic
problems such as chronic health crises, massive poverty, homelessness etc. However,
this critique wrongly assumes that countries put all their policy eggs in the judicial
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basket. No country in the world does so and India certainly does not do so. In fact, most
countries have massive social and economic programs geared to address chronic
problems in society that constitute socio-economic rights violations. These are often
supported and expanded by many civil society actors such as NGOs. The role of the
court is by definition, a limited and supplementary one even in countries such as India
where massive public-private programs are put in place to address poverty, homelessness,
AIDS crisis and so forth, and the Court must often take on an administrative law model
of judging to monitor the delivery of government programs.
While the traditional criticisms of socio-economic rights continue to matter, there
are whole range of new issues that have arisen regarding the conceptualization and
enforcement of these rights, as well as the actors on whom liability may be imposed for
violations. The context for these new issues lies in greater social movement struggles
over socio-economic rights. These new issues must be properly understood and
appreciated by judges, if socio-economic rights are to be successfully and sustainably
realized.
By now it is obvious that one of the major reasons for the weakness of socioeconomic rights is the extent to which these rights have been reduced to either building
state capacity or to consumerism. Put differently, socio-economic rights have been the
victims of the ideology of development and so-called 3rd generation rights have especially
become a proxy for the frustrations of Third World states due to their failure to achieve a
NIEO. This is unfortunate, and the whole regime of human rights needs to be freed from
the stifling ideological baggage of the 1960s that continues to bedevil it. That ideological
baggage saw development in macroeconomic terms, a matter of large capital-intensive
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projects, import substituting industrialization, a large state presence in civil society
including control of unions, a single party structure, weak judiciaries, a nation-building
ideology, a commitment to the rationale of ‘catching up’ with the West, and the
valorization of the national identity over all other identities. Contesting the ideology of
development is central to this task and it has not truly begun except in the periphery in
the form of social movement action in the Third World.90 In the eyes of social
movements, which consist of the most vulnerable and poor populations in the Third
World, it is the attempt to impose ‘development’ on them that have made them worse off.
Development is, in this view, the disease rather than the cure. Without performing this
cathartic task, socio-economic rights will simply continue to be seen as the best way to
sneak a gigantic welfare state in, while so-called 3rd generation rights will continue to be
seen as a replay of a tired old debate over technology transfer, greater development
assistance and better terms of trade. While a welfare state and the goals of the NIEO may
continue to be important, they must be sought elsewhere and through different channels,
and not through the human rights discourse.
A second challenge is to reconceptualize the background norms of private law –
including property, contracts and tort – that underlie the operation of the market which
produces and perpetuates poverty, domination and exclusion.91 This is perhaps the most
difficult challenge in making socio-economic rights a reality to those to whom they
matter most. The regime of human rights, including socio-economic rights, has
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traditionally been conceived of as a regime of public law, with very littler bearing on
private law. Thus, human rights were conceptualized in the classical tradition as rights of
individuals against the state and in the absence of any state action, violations of
individual rights by other private actors were – and still are - not considered violations of
human rights. This nexus with the state, while reflecting its classical liberal roots, makes
the classical doctrine of human rights less useful and relevant in a Third World country
such as India. Many human rights violations, including most violations of socioeconomic rights, occur in the private arena of the market or the family, and the rules that
structure social relationships in these arenas have been largely untouched by the moral
impulses of the human rights regime. This is particularly true in India where the teaching
and the practice of private law follows a very doctrinaire, Blackstonian path with little
regard to the outcomes of private law transactions on the most vulnerable. An added
source of illegitimacy in the post-colonial context of India is that these private law
regimes mostly remain unchanged from the colonial period and perpetuate the
exploitation and domination that these regimes were set up to perpetuate.
A third challenge is the clear rise of non-state actors in international politics.
Both transnational corporations as well as transnational social movement networks now
have profound impact on international law and politics. The former wield enormous
power over national governments while the latter have transformed the space of law
making and implementation. During the last decade, social movements have compelled
the adoption of a major treaty (Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Landmines), created
new international institutional innovations (World Bank Complaints Panel, World
Commission on Dams, Commission on Sustainable Development, IMF Ombudsman) and
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other multistakeholder initiatives (Mining Review, Global Compact, corporate social
responsibility movement including actors such as Global Reporting Initiative) and
transformed compliance mechanisms (especially in environmental law).92 In addition,
social movement action also led to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons93, as clearly recognized
by international lawyers94. Many, if not most, of social movement action has been
targeted towards the enforcement of socio-economic rights. This new form of politics
will inevitably have a profound impact on the Indian Supreme Court soon if only because
Indian social movements are so deeply embedded in transnational networks. It is
imperative that judges remain conscious abut how their constituency is rapidly changing
from an exclusive club of domestic public interest groups suing local authorities to a
range of transnational social movement networks that take on transnational actors such as
corporations and even international agencies. That is likely to emerge as the frontline of
socio-economic adjudication and the Court is likely to be a site of contention.
A fourth new issue that must be noted is the rising concern about the increasing
incompatibility between fundamental norms of international law relating to human rights
and other aspects of international law that promote economic globalization.95 In
particular, conflicts are emerging between the international trade regime on the one hand
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and norms protecting human rights and environment on the other. Similarly, conflicts
have emerged between the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions and norms of
international law in the area of human rights and environment. The Court cannot remain
oblivious to these developments. As India enforces its obligations under the WTO
regime of treaties through the enactment of statutes, the Court is likely to see legal
challenges to these statutes on the ground, inter alia, that they violate international human
rights law and the Court must decide that conflict between trade law and human rights
law. In other words, the Court cannot simply call for incorporating international law into
domestic law in cases involving human rights, when there are several unresolved issues
concerning the incorporation of other branches of international law into domestic law as
well as the relationship between different branches of international law once they are
incorporated into domestic law. The Supreme Court has not begun paying attention to
these issues nor has the Bar begun engaging with them. In addition, questions are
increasingly arising about the legal responsibilities of international institutions such as
the WTO, World Bank and the IMF, which remain oblivious to the broad obligations of
all actors under international law to respect human rights. These organizations are not
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court. Due to their diplomatic immunity, they cannot
be sued in national courts even when they violate human rights norms through their
policies and projects. To address this partially, the World Bank established the
Complaints Panel in 1993 but that body is not a judicial one. It does not apply
international law; rather it simply checks if the projects complained of have violated
World Bank’s own internal policies known as ‘operational directives’. The IMF’s
Ombudsman is even weaker and does not allow complaints from individuals to be

40

entertained. The WTO has no mechanism for complaints by individuals or groups from
states that lose in its proceedings. The impartiality and independence of WTO panels and
Appellate Body leave a lot to be desired and poor countries – let alone vulnerable groups
within these countries – have very little if any, say in how WTO is run. Yet, these
organizations have profound impact on human rights of poor people, farmers, women,
minorities and indigenous groups, fishermen/women and other vulnerable groups. These
impacts are mostly on the livelihoods and cultural identity of these groups and
individuals. The last refuge of these groups and individuals is often the Supreme Court
and the Court must begin to fashion a jurisprudence of remedies for wrongs that are
attributable to overseas entities. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that the decisions of
international bodies – whether the Security Council or the WTO – may end up being
reviewed by domestic constitutional courts such as the Indian Supreme Court in the
future, involving difficult questions of balancing different aspects of international law in
domestic enforcement. In many of the new areas of challenge, adjudication is some way
off and even if begun, it may not immediately and by itself change the profound
inequities of the international system with its maldistribution of resources, gender and
race oppression and assaults on cultural identities. On the other hand, an activist
judiciary may make an important difference to the politics of reform in many social and
economic areas by compelling national states and international agencies to acknowledge
that there are limits to what they can do even in the name of ‘progress’ or ‘development.
Judicializing socio-economic rights may also serve to recover human rights from its selfimposed limitations, by aiding the political and social demands of social movements but
only so long as socio-economic rights are reconceptualized, as I have argued.
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IV. Judicial activism on socio-economic rights and social movements: Lessons from
abroad

The first priority is to begin reconceptualizing socio-economic rights and
recentering them as mobilizing strategies, as I have argued. Without doing this,
entrenching socio-economic rights in the Constitution or importing international human
rights through judicial interpretation, will only reproduce arguments for state capacity or
market fundamentalism. In other words, an unquestioning embrace of socio-economic
rights will hardly result in progressive politics.96 If this task is commenced, courts may
actually be able to use the category of socio-economic rights for assisting positive social
change. But this task lies far ahead. For example, it is well known that there is little by
way of international jurisprudence on socio-economic human rights. This is partly
because the institutions that can potentially have the maximum impact on these rights are
declining competence while existing international courts are skewed in favor of civil and
political rights or confined to specific territorial jurisdiction as in the case of the
International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia or Rwanda (ICTY/ICTR). The
ICJ, the Law of the Sea Court as well as the newly established International Criminal
Court (ICC) are not much relevant in protecting socio-economic rights, with some
exceptions. The ICJ hears only disputes between states and with some exceptions (to be
discussed below), has not ruled in any significant way on these rights. The Law of the
Sea Court could potentially have a major impact on socio-economic rights, but has been
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established only very recently. The ICC does not concern itself with everyday violations,
and is, in any case, unlikely to take up even massive violations of economic or social
rights per se, unless it is in the course of armed conflict. The institutions that can have
the maximum impact on these rights include the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.
However, the World Bank has consistently maintained that it is prohibited by its articles
of agreement from considering ‘political’ factors though in recent years it has moved to
embrace a narrow, market-oriented version of human rights and rule of law as part of its
mandate. Its Complaints Panel does not apply any international law to evaluate Bank
projects, as I noted earlier, though some of its recent findings show an acute awareness of
the ethical basis of critical World Bank policies relating, for example, to indigenous
peoples. In a recent finding on the Qinghai project in China, the Panel found that the
poverty reduction project had failed to count entire towns of ethnic Tibetan minorities as
part of project displaced97. On the whole, however, the Panel remains weak and of little
relevance to what the Bank does. The IMF has also consistently refused to consider
human rights impact of its policies though it now considers poverty impact, gender
impact and environmental impact of its policies. The WTO has explicitly refused to
consider human rights impact of its policies and treaties though the purpose of
international trade is, according to the Marrakech agreement that established the WTO,
the increase in employment, human welfare and prosperity. In addition, most of these
organizations function in secret and therefore make it impossible to evaluate what sort of
factors are taken into account in their decisions.
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Existing international mechanisms of a judicial character such as the UN Human
Rights Committee (HRC) do not deal with socio-economic rights due to their subject
matter jurisdiction. There is in fact no international court right now, which has
jurisdiction over these rights. The Committee on socio-economic rights under the
ICESCR is not a court and does not receive complaints like the HRC though its general
comments and comments on country reports have been very helpful in developing the
jurisprudence in this area. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has had very little to
say on these or any rights though some recent judgments give some hope. In Hungary v.
Slovakia98, the court was able to expound on the dispute between the two nations over the
construction of a dam on the river Danube, and state responsibility for non-performance
of treaty obligations. The majority opinion as well as Judge Weeramantry’s concurring
opinion made an important contribution by rearticulating the legal basis for the principle
of sustainable development in international law. By creatively interpreting this principle,
the opinion showed the intricate connection between environment, human rights and
cultural survival. Similarly, in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory Opinion, the ICJ has
explicitly recognized the right to environment, a so-called 3rd generation right, as a
human right99. Again, Judge Weeramantry’s dissent stands out as a classic in exploring
the impact of nuclear weapons on socio-economic rights. Finally, in Botswana v.
Namibia100, Justice Weeramantry’s dissent shows how even in a matter that is as
traditional as boundary delimitation, communal property ownership by indigenous
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peoples cannot be trumped arbitrarily by international law and how principles of
environmental law and equity serve to shape outcomes.
Other international courts such as the ICTY and ICTR or the HRC have had little
to say about socio-economic rights due to their subject matter or territorial jurisdiction,
though the ICTY has, in some judgments, clearly recognized forced eviction of minorities
as a gross violation of international law relating to housing, among others101. This
interpretation, which follows international law as reflected in UN documents (such as the
reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Housing), shows how humanitarian law
can be creatively applied to socio-economic rights when there is evidence of massive or
gross violation based on race, ethnicity, gender or any of the other prohibited grounds
under Article 2 of the ICESCR.
The encouraging trends in the area of socio-economic rights come from at least
four directions:

a. Comparative constitutional adjudication: Several domestic courts have recently
passed important judgments in the area of rights to health, housing, property,
education, environment, livelihood, and other related socio-economic rights.
Most prominent among them is the South African (SA) Constitutional Court,
which has now achieved a well-deserved reputation for passing landmark
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judgments in the area of socio-economic rights which are justiciable under the
South African Constitution, unlike the Indian constitution.102 In three landmark
judgments in recent years, Soobramoney103, Grootboom104, and the HIV
Treatment Action Campaign case105, the South African court has made important
contributions to the growth of socio-economic rights jurisprudence. I cannot
discuss these cases in detail due to lack of space, but one novelty of Grootboom
and the HIV Treatment Action Campaign cases is the indirect endorsement by the
court of the idea of core minimum standards for socio-economic rights, by
arguing that any housing plan that doesn’t provide for the short-term needs of the
most vulnerable is not ‘reasonable’. The idea of core minimum standards, which
had been articulated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
in 1990106, postulated that even though socio-economic rights are progressively
realizable subject to available resources, there is a core minimum of each right
that must be assured to each individual by the states especially when the
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population concerned is very vulnerable and/or in crisis. The South African court
explicitly distanced itself from that position but ended up reaching a similar
outcome by its reliance on the notion of ‘reasonableness’. Indeed, the Grootboom
case could be seen to endorse the highly limited traditional framework of human
rights law, which reduces socio-economic rights to mean a right to government
programs, as I argued above. Nevertheless, the judgments of the South African
court have had a major moralizing influence on discussions about socio-economic
rights, partly because the Court’s activism has been part of a larger social
movements-led mobilization for social justice within South Africa. Its opinions
carry a great deal of importance not only because South Africa is the world’s first
human rights-oriented state, but also because its constitution expressly allows the
court to consider international law in its interpretation. This has allowed the
growth of judicial globalization, as the court freely borrows from the
jurisprudence of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as
well as the jurisprudence of other countries such as India, Canada or Germany.
b. Constitutionalization of rights: Constitutions or amendments adopted since the
late 1980s have often incorporated new rights such as the right to environment
(Mongolia, South Africa), communal property rights for indigenous people and
rights to cultural identity (Colombia, India), local self government (India, Brazil)
and right to education (India).107 This trend is indicative of a new sensibility
about the increasing importance of socio-economic rights as universal human
rights. The Supreme Court could take this development into account especially
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while interpreting customary international law or general principles of
international law, but so far it has not shown that it wants to do so.
c. Regional jurisprudence: Regional courts have been active in pushing the
boundaries of human rights to include socio-economic rights. The European
Court of Human Rights has decided a number of recent cases on the right to
housing, forced evictions and right to property, especially those that involve
discrimination on prohibited grounds – both violations of article 8 of the
Convention (right to privacy/home) as well as article 1 of Protocol No.1 (right to
property/possessions).108 The Inter American Commission on Human Rights and
the Inter American Court on Human Rights have been active in this regard.
While several of the latter Court’s opinions remain relevant for the growth of
socio-economic rights jurisprudence – such as Velasquez Rodriguez case which
established the liability of non-state actors for human rights violations109 – a
recent decision stands out. In Awas Tingni110, the Inter-American Court declared
that Nicaragua had violated the right to property and the right to judicial
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protection (or amparo remedy) under the American Convention by not
demarcating and titling the land of Awas Tingni community speedily, by granting
a logging concession to a company over their land and by denying speedy justice
when they complained. This decision has profound implications for different
areas of international and domestic law including the law of indigenous peoples,
the law of sustainable development, human rights, and even on the conception of
sovereignty.
d. Social Movements: A fourth trend is the growing strength of social movements
domestically and internationally and their greater ability and willingness to use
legal forums to wage their battles. In the Awas Tingni case for example, a
transnational coalition of indigenous rights was actively involved in litigation.
Similarly, the HIV Treatment Action case in South Africa was part of a global
struggle waged by a transnational social movement with strong domestic roots to
ensure affordable access to drugs for HIV patients. Domestically, many of the
recent trends referred to here (for example, the constitutional reforms in
Colombia) have been driven largely by social movement action. These
movements are overwhelmingly focused on the realization of socio-economic
rights. In the face of such energy, courts cannot, for long, resist being engaged in
these issues.

V. Conclusion
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I have argued in this essay that the Indian Supreme Court’s record in protecting
human rights shows a bias against socio-economic rights of the poor and the dispossessed
and that this bias may be explained by two sets of factors: a first set of factors, internal to
the Indian system, that have positioned the Court as an organ of governance, thereby
sharing the biases of many of the goals and methods of governance itself; and a second
set of factors that derive from the biased nature of the human rights discourse itself. I
have also argued that recent international and comparative judicial experience has much
to offer the Indian Supreme Court to transform its jurisprudence into a more peoplefriendly one. Socio-economic rights do not have to remain as second-class rights to
which courts pay lip service and even that only so long as they fit into a developmentalist
world view. However, in order to do so, these rights must themselves be
reconceptualized to move away from market fundamentalism, state fetishism and the
culture-ideology of consumerism. They must, instead, be refashioned as counterhegemonic mobilizing strategies in which the Court and social movements partner to
achieve social justice. The Court must also begin to pay more attention to emerging
dimensions of socio-economic rights including the responsibilities of transnational
corporations and agencies as well as the relationship between different branches of
international law in domestic law. There are creative opportunities for expanding the
jurisprudence of the Court. There are a number of substantive and procedural areas
where the frontiers of law can be pushed to make it more legitimate. The Court’s
legitimacy will depend to a large extent on its ability to offer support to social movement
struggles which are primarily focused on the realization of economic and social rights at a
time of economic liberalization and globalization.
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